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I. Introduction 
This article tells the story of a Korean machinery firm, which sought to 
absorb imported foreign technology, assimilate it and then diWse it in the 
1970's to Korea. Through this story, the reader will gain an understanding of 
the political, social, and economic context in which Korean enterprises 
managed their businesses in a decade of rapid economic growth. This case 
will also illustrate the role that the Korean government played in assisting 
businesses in building up their competitive strength in order to make a posi- 
tive and significant contribution to the growth of the national economy. 
The firm which will be examined was founded as the Chosun Machine 
Works in 1937 when Korea was still under Japanese occupation. During that 
era it produced industrial machines, mining equipment, and weapons such 
as artillery and small submarines. After Japan's retreat in 1945, the firm was 
nationalized by the Korean government and resumed production of indus - 
trial machines under government management and control. 
In 1968, the Korean government handed the company over to private 
hands. The new owners changed the name of the company to Hankook Ma- 
chine Industrial Co., Ltd. (to be abbreviated as Hanki). Since 1968, the 
company has extended into several new business areas and diversified its 
main products aggressively. Despite its leading role in the machinery indus- 
try in Korea, however, the company experienced chronic deficits until 1975, 
primarily due to the result of i n ~ ~ c i e n t  domestic demand for their 
products. In 1976, Daewoo Corporation, one of Korea's top five business 
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groups, took over the company and renamed it Daewoo Heavy Industrial 
Company(DH1) Limited. 
II. Business Environments in Korea in the 1970's 
Despite the rapid economic growth achieved during the First and Second 
Five-Year Economic Development Plans(1962-1971), the Korean economy 
was still struggling with the problems it had inherited from the chronic pov- 
erty of the past. Insufficient domestic savings, heavy dependency on foreign 
capital for development financing, chronic inflation, a backward industrial 
structure, and a lack of industrial technologies were all problems that had 
yet to be resolved at that point. 
With the level of capital accumulation negligible, and the volume of trade 
very small, the ability of most Korean business firms to raise much-needed 
capital through self-financing was limited Most business enterprises could 
not finance even with the help of foreign loans. The capital which could be 
raised through the issuance of public stocks or debentures was simply inad- 
equate. Under these circumstances, the Korean government established 
some guidelines to facilitate the financing needed for economic development 
while fostering the stock market and campaigning for the promotion of dom- 
estic savings. Foreign direct investment was also encouraged, but restricted 
up to a level of 60 percent of total equity. Foreign loans were approved and 
guaranteed by the government only when they were to be used for the ac- 
quisition of capital goods and advanced technology which were not available 
locally. 
III. Governmental Policy Measures 
In order to accelerate the growth of the natiorsal economy, aggressive 
strong policy measures were adopted by the Korean government. The three 
most important measures were : 
(1) the promotion of the Saemaeul(New Community) Movement to rear 
rural development by stimulating the spirit of diligence, self-help, and 
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cooperation among farmers and fishermen ; 
(2) the Presidential Decree of August 3, 1972 to alleviate the financial 
burdens of business enterprises by coercing all curb-market financing 
terms into bank rate loans, and 
(3) the Presidential Declaration of a Heavy and Chemical Industrialization 
Policy of January 12, 1973. 
Of these three policies, the third measure had the most significant impact 
on the technological advancement of the Korean machine industry. Heavy 
imports of capital goods, as well as industrial raw materials, caused serious 
balance of payment problems and made the economy more dependent on 
foreign savings. Thus, the Korean government wanted to enhance industrial 
independence through increased domestic production of both industrial raw 
materials and capital goods. Therefore, the steel, and 
non-ferrous metal industries were selected for intensive development as 
suppliers of raw materials. On the other hand, the government focused upon 
the machinery and electronics industries for development of capital goods 
suppliers. 
Because demands for equipment funds were expected to grow much more 
rapidly than in the past, the National Investment Fund was established to 
finance the construction of heavy and chemical industries. The purpose and 
character of the National Investment Fund may be summarized as follows: 
First, the Fund was created to provide additional capital, in addition to 
equity and foreign loans, required for the construction of plants planned for 
both the heavy and chemical industries. Working capital requirements were 
given secondary priority, but these needs could also be financed with loans 
from the Fund. Second, the plan was to supply low interest loans by means 
of establishing a combined pool of funds from citizens' bank deposits, which 
were induced at high interest rates, and funds subscribed by the government 
at zero rate of interest. In this way the government sought to provide long 
term loans for the construction of heavy and chemical industry plants at ex- 
tremely low interest rates. Third, the maturity period of the loans issued by 
the Fund was far longer than the traditional five years, with flexibility 
depending on circumstances. 
Industrial sites were also constructed through government initiatives. In 
order to support the construction of selected industrial sites, the Industrial 
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Site Development Promotion Law was enacted in 1973. The Korea Water 
Resource Development Corporation, which was established in 1967, was also 
reorganized in order to enhance its ability to work effectively with other 
programs involving industrial site construction and development. The Gumi 
Electronics Industry Complex, Changwon Machine Industry Base, Yeocheon 
Chemical Industry Base, and many others were constructed by the Industrial 
Sites Development Corporation. Another important supporting measure pro- 
vided by the government to promote the heavy and chemical industries was 
the construction of infrastructure such as harbor facilities, communication 
networks, highways, and industrial roads to support commerce. 
IV. Importation of Diesel Engine Technology by Hanki 
Encouraged by government guidance and the supporting measures de - 
scribed above, Hanki began to investigate the possibility of manufacturing 
diesel engines. Hanki management believed that as Korean industry began 
to expand, the transport volume of industrial goods would also increase, and 
thereby create a demand for diesel engines for trucks and buses. Their in- 
vestigation showed that the engine types produced by M.A.N. of West 
Germany were the most suitable for their purpose. 
Negotiations between Hanki and M. A. N. proceeded faster than was usual 
due to favorable loan conditions from the German fund, Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau of West Germany. On August 31, 1970, a licensing agreement 
was concluded between the two companies : 
Maschinenfabrik Augusburg- 
Nuernberg (M. A. N. ) Augusburg, 
Federal Republic of Germany as the 
licensor ; 
and 
Hankook Machine Industrial Co., 
Ltd. (Hanki) Inchon, Korea as 
the licensee. 
The central objective of the agreement was to produce diesel engines of 
type D 0844, power 50 to 90 HP, DIN and type D 0846, power 130 to 160 HP, 
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DIN, including all modifications and improvements made to the engines dur- 
ing the period covered by the agreement. The scope of the license contained 
marketing of the engines in Asia, except India and Turkey. The services of 
the licensor were to provide the specific information and documentation 
needed for the production of engines. The licensor assured the licensee the 
use of its own industrial rights plus foreign rights which the licensor was al- 
lowed to use. The agreement was due to run for five years after the com- 
mencement of production, when it could be renewed for a further five years. 
In this event, the royalties for the period of renewal were to be 
renegotiated. After ten years of production no royalties were to be levied. 
The royalty fees agreed upon in the contract were subdivided into a single 
basic fee of DM 500,000, and a current fee. The current fee rate was to de- 
pend on the accumulated volume of production. For example, for the first 
15,000 liters of cylinder capacity of a year's accumulated production the cur- 
rent fee was to be levied at DM 22.50 per liter, and for the next 150,000 liters 
in the same year, the current fee was DM 18.75 per liter, etc. 
Interestingly, the agreement contained a special contract concerning the 
employment of Korean skilled workers. On October 28, 1970 a skeleton con- 
tract was concluded between Hanki and MAN. providing for the employ- 
ment of up to 500 Korean skilled workers at the engine and truck manufac- 
turing plants of M. AN. in Germany. 
In line with the agreemenet Hanki workers began to work at M.A.N. from 
January 1, 1971. 
V. Absorption of Techology into the Company 
The production of engines started in May 1975, but the initial production 
depth was rather shallow until the second stage of construction of production 
lines for crank shaft, cam shaft, and connecting rod manufacture, which was 
completed in March 1976. The engine plant was designed to produce 24,000 
pieces per year according to the advice of the German consulting firm, 
Aktiengesellschaft fur Entwicklungsplanung (AGEPLAN), which assumed 
the feasibility study of the project. The actual volume of production for this 
operation from 1975 to 1979 is shown in Table 1 : 
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Table 1 Production and Sales Figures(unit : pieces) 
In 1975 there were three major automobile manufactures in Korea How- 
ever, they were reluctant to use the diesel engines that Hanki produced. 
They had several reasons for this. First, they had no confidence in the qual- 
ity of domestic engines as they were already having trouble with the quality 
of other automobile parts which had been supplied to them domestically. 
Second, there was insufficient or even negative price incentive to use do- 
mestic engines. By negative price incentive, we mean, that the price of do- 
mestic engines was higher than of those imported. This negative incentive 
phenomenon prevailied not only with engines but also with most other ma- 
chinery products. The reasons for the phenomenon were as follows : (1) Be- 
cause of insufficient market size, economies of scale could not be achieved in 
production ; (2) Parts and raw materials which were needed for the dom- 
estic production of a machinery product were inported from abroad at very 
high cost (due to the small order quanties, cheaper prices could not be 
negotiated) : (3) Because of the high debt-equity ratio of the firm, the price 
of their products included a larger burden of interest costs than did their 
competitors in advanced countries : (4) Costs incurred due to inexperience 
and lack of technology also had to be added to the price of their products. 
For these reasons, domestic machinery products were naturally more ex- 
pensive than foreign parts. 
production 
sales 
defective ( % ) 
VI. Assimilation of Imported Technology 
Furthermore, there were technical problems that had to be overcome for 
Hanki's engines to actually be mounted on automobiles. Engines are not end 
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tween a subsystem and its higher system, there always exists a certain de- 
gree of interdependence. In order for an independently designed and 
manufactured engine to be mounted on a vehicle, numerous technical 
problems must first be resolved so that the two can be integrated into a 
functioning total system. However, Korean automobile manufacturers had 
already been producing trucks and buses with imported foreign engines 
prior to the introduction of Hanki motors in 1975. Thus, it was not immedi- 
ately possible for the Hanki engines to be mounted on domestic vehicles. 
The Licensing agreement contained no clauses nor did it mention anything 
about this adaptation problem. It was apparently a planning mistake for 
Hanki to have overlooked such a basic and yet critical consideration. 
In summary, due to confidence gaps, negative price incentives and adap- 
tation difficulties, the engines Hanki produced in 1975 could not establish a 
niche in the marketplace. Consequently, Hanki began to face insurmount- 
able financial difficulties and eventually was placed in receivership by the 
government-owned Korean Development Bank which was the company's 
major creditor. 
In response to this (evolving) situation the Korean government began to 
seek a private firm with sufficient managerial and technical competence to 
solve Hanki's problems. In February 1976 Daewoo Corporation was selected 
to fulfill this role and was persuaded by the Korean government to take over 
Hanki. 
Having bought a controlling interest in Hanki, Daewoo corporation 
changed Hanki's name to Daewoo Heavy Industries company(DH1) and be- 
gan to focus its attention on solving the firm's problems. The first of the 
major steps taken by Daewoo was to ask the Korean Government to impose 
a ban on the importation of foreign-made diesel engines into Korea The 
Korean Government accepted Daewoo's proposal on the condition that the 
price of DHI's diesel engines would be subject to Government control. 
At the same time Daewoo launched a project to work out the mounting 
problem. First, Daewoo's project team worked in collaboration with the 
Korean Institute of Science and Technology(KIST), a research institute es- 
tablished by the Korean Government to help business firms solve technical 
problems. Also in case technical problems required deeper knowledge and 
experience, Daewoo asked M. A. N. for assistance. In the beginning, M. A. N. 
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was reluctant to provide extra assistance which had not been included in the 
licensing agreement. However, after repeated requests from Daewoo, and 
having learned about the serious market difficulties that had resulted from 
the mounting problem, M.A.N. began to aid Daewoo. After a year of hard 
work, Daewoo finally succeeded in resolving most of the problems related to 
mounting their engines on buses, trucks, and other heavy-duty vehicles 
manufactured in Korea. 
M. The Diffusion of Imported Technology 
The diffusion of imported technology took place in two different forms. 
One form was the diffusion of technology to firms that were competing with 
DHI, and the other was to other firms which supplied inputs to DHI. 
Diffusion to the competing firms took place through DHI engineers who 
were tempted to move to competing companies with promises of salary 
increases and promotions. At the time when DHI built its first diesel engine 
plant in Korea there were no domestic competitors involved in diesel engine 
manufacturing. However, Hyundai Motor Company in Ulsan Korea, began to 
prepare to enter this field only a couple of years after DHI started its oper- 
ation. Engineers were vulnerable to inducements from the competing firm. 
One piece of evidence which suggests that the movement of these engineers 
resulted in the diffusion of technology is the fact that when they moved to 
another company, these moves to other firms were not made by individuals, 
but, rather, by entire teams of employees who had worked together at DHI. 
These mass movements of employees to competitor companies were quite 
common during the boom years of 1975 through 1978, and such losses were 
extremely detrimental to the sound accumulation of technological capabili - 
ties within the firms. During this period, there were even legal disputes in 
which firms accused one another of "technical manpower robbery," some- 
times using blue prints to show how the 'burglary' worked and impacted the 
firm. 
Diffusion of technology to firms who supplied components and parts to 
DHI came naturally. This kind of diffusion might be described as forced dif- 
fusion. The special characteristic of such diffusion is due to the very nature 
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of machinery manufacturing. A machine is the result of assemblage of parts 
or components which function together systematically to perform a specified 
job. There are so many parts involved in a machine that it is neither 
technically nor economically feasible to manufacture all the needed parts 
within the firm which produces the machine. Thus, even in industrially ad- 
vanced countries, the structure of the machinery industry is based on coordi- 
nation and cooperation among a large number of firms. 
Furthermore, due to the systematic nature of machines, that is, as ma- 
chine components or parts function together systematically to perform a 
specified job, the quality of a machine depends very much on the quality of 
each and every functioning part. Because of this systematic nature, the the- 
ory of economy of specialization should be observed. DHI believed in the 
theory and established a program for coordination and cooperation with 
small machinery firms on a stable and long term basis. This movement was 
also in line with government directives fostering programs for the 
localization of materials, equipment and parts. These programs achieved a 
reasonable degree of success and made significant contributions to cost and 
foreign currency savings. 
VIII. Fiidings and Conclusions 
An interesting finding from the analysis of this case is that the employ- 
ment contract which was concluded in 1970 between Hanki and M.A.N., 
stipulating the employment of Hanki's skilled workers at M.AN.'s manufac- 
turing plants in Germany, played an important role in the absorption of the 
imported manufacturing technology for diesel engines. According to the 
contracts, 350 technical operators from Hanki were sent to Germany. On ex- 
piration of the employment contract, they returned to Korea to resume their 
work at Hanki. With the experience and practical training they obtained in 
Germany, they played a decisive role during the operating stage of the 
newly imported production facilities. 
Analytically speaking, this kind of employment contract is different in 
nature from a normal training program in three aspects : (1) The large num- 
ber of trainees involved ; (2) The two year period during which Hanki 
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employees worked in Germany was much longer than the standard training 
programs : (3) The trainees were paid and treated as if they were 
employees of M.A.N during their placement. 
This kind of employment contract program was made possible by the will- 
ingness of the technology-supplier to accept such a large number of people 
as their employees for this period of time. In the case of Hanki and M.A.N. 
this arrangement was possible because in the early 19703, Germany was be- 
ginning to experience a serious shortage of skilled workers. 
In addition to the employment contract for skilled manpower, Hanki took 
full advantage of an engineers training program that was prescribed in the 
licensing agreement. More than 30 engineers were sent to M.A.N. in 
Germany to obtain technical training in relation to the manufacturing 
processes involved in the production of diesel engines. Thus, because of the 
intensive and extensive formal and "on-the-job" training which they 
received in Germany, the Korean skilled workers and engineers who were 
temporarily employed or trained by M.A.N. in Germany were able to play 
the most important roles in absorbing the imported technology during the 
start-up, operation and maintenance of the imported facilities. 
The evidence that this approach to introducing new technology led to 
rapid absorption is convincing. Production volume steadily approached the 
output level planned in the design capacity of the plant while simultaneously 
the rate of defective items per 100 declined rapidly and dramatically as can 
be seen in Table 1. 
During the latter half of the 1970s, the Korean economy grew at a rate of 
more than 10% annually while real industrial growth averaged about 30% 
per annum. Total transport volume rose rapidly during the same period, and 
the nation experienced sharp shortages in trucks and buses. However, due 
to the restricted production capacity of vehicle manufacturers, the shortage 
problem remained unsolved until the 1980s. The sales volume of diesel 
engines was stalled at  levels far below the volume initially forecast. 
Another conclusion from the case analysis is that without a continuous and 
stable demand for products, it is impossible to sustain continuity in the 
utilization of employees in technical activities related to product manufac- 
ture. Further, when the continuity of men engaged in the technical activities 
is broken, the continual accumulation of the technical knowledge is seriously 
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hampered. During the earlier stages of diesel engine production there was 
insufficient demand in the market for the engines. Therefore, competent 
engineers v7ho were employed in the diesel engine project were transferred 
to other projects. The company could not afford to keep these human 
resources dedicated to a project in which they were losing money. In most 
developing countries even large companies lack the financial strength to re-  
tain highly-paid technical engineers simply for the purpose of accumulating 
technical knowledge when a project continues to operate in the red. Thus, 
initially the absorption of imported technology was quite rapid during the 
earliest stages of the project, but the absorption of knowledge beyond the 
production stage was unstable because of the instability of involvement of 
both engineers and technical employees. As a result, when the company 
wanted to modify or improve the products, such as power-up, power-down, 
reduction of weight, etc., they again were forced to seek technical assistance 
from a foreign licensor rather than develop such innovations and 
improvements through internal research and development. Thus the 
company was forced to secure the assistance of Isuzu and Toyota of Japan as 
new technical collaborators when efforts were made to build smaller diesel 
engines in 1977. 
The company has now grown to comprise four major plants ; an industrial 
machine plant, a diesel engine plant, a rolling stock plant, and a precision 
machinery plant. The company has launched ambitious projects in heavy 
machinery areas including engineering services and plant sales on a 
turn-key basis throughout the world market with annual sales of US $1 
billion as of 1992. 
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